Accountability in transnational relations: how distinctive is it? by Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias
  
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
Accountability in transnational relations: 
how distinctive is it? 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: 
Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (2010) Accountability in transnational relations: how distinctive is 
it? West European Politics, 33 (5). pp. 1142-1164. ISSN 0140-2382 
 
DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2010.486142 
 
© 2010 Taylor & Francis 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/29564/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: September 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
 1 
Accountability in transnational relations: how distinctive is it? 
 
Mathias Koenig-Archibugi 
 
Published in West European Politics, 33 (5). pp. 1142-1164. ISSN 0140-2382 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have used the concept of 
“accountability” to describe and assess relationships among actors who are primarily 
based in different state jurisdictions, or involving actors transcending state jurisdictions. 
Is there something inherently distinctive about accountability in transnational spaces as 
compared to the more familiar instances of accountability observed in domestic 
contexts? This article examines the distinctiveness of transnational accountability in 
relation to: (1) its general meaning and specific forms; (2) its aims and importance; (3) 
its empirical existence and the relative frequency of its forms; (4) its causes; and (5) its 
effects. The article cautiously concludes that on most of these dimensions the 
similarities outweigh the differences and that it would be unfruitful for research on 
transnational accountability to develop separately from that on domestic accountability. 
 
 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
 
Few fallacies are frowned upon by International Relations (IR) scholars more than those 
related to naïve applications of the so-called “domestic analogy”. In Hidemi Suganami’s 
classic definition, the domestic analogy consists of “presumptive reasoning […] about 
international relations based on the assumption that since domestic and international 
phenomena are similar in a number of respects, a given proposition which holds true 
domestically, but whose validity is as yet uncertain internationally, will also hold true 
internationally” (Suganami 1989: 24). In recent years, an increasing number of scholars 
have used the concept of “accountability” to describe and assess relationships among 
actors who are primarily based in different state jurisdictions, or involving actors 
transcending state jurisdictions – in short, transnational relations.1 To what extent does 
this trend reflect an unwarranted application of the domestic analogy? Is the conceptual 
baggage associated to the term “accountability” unsuitable for travelling beyond state 
borders?  
 In a sense, those questions appear futile, since the language of accountability is 
unlikely to disappear from debates about transnational relations. A more fruitful way of 
addressing the sceptics’ concerns is to ask whether there is something inherently 
distinctive about accountability in transnational spaces. If there is, this would provide at 
least a strong case for inverting the domestic analogy and for presuming that any given 
proposition about accountability which holds true domestically will probably not hold 
true internationally. Analyses of domestic and transnational accountability may then 
progress more satisfactorily if they proceed on separate tracks. To be sure, 
distinctiveness can occur at various levels and concern different dimensions of the 
concept. In this paper, the distinctiveness of transnational accountability is examined in 
                                                 
1 A small selection: Held 1995; Woods 2001; Keohane and Nye 2003; Clark et al. 2003; Scholte 
2005; Grant and Keohane 2005; Kahler 2005; Slaughter 2005; Macdonald and Macdonald 2006; 
Zweifel 2006; Risse 2006; Ebrahim and Weisband 2007; Newell 2008. To be sure, in the IR 
literature accountability is still much less used than other concepts, such as hegemony, 
balancing, bargaining, signalling, norm diffusion, epistemic communities, or two-level games. 
In article “transnational relations” is used in the broadest sense and includes intergovernmental 
institutions.  
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relation to (1) its general meaning and specific forms; (2) its aims and importance; (3) 
its empirical existence and the relative frequency of its forms; (4) its causes; and (5) its 
effects. Each of these dimensions or levels is examined in a separate section of this 
paper. The paper cautiously concludes that on most of these dimensions the similarities 
outweigh the differences and that it would be unfruitful for research on transnational 
accountability to develop separately from that on domestic accountability. 
 
 
1. Conceptualization 
 
Studies on the nature and significance of accountability often start by lamenting the 
fuzziness and manipulability of the concept. However, accountability can be used as an 
analytical lens that may help observers capture certain relationships of communication 
and power better than other analytical concepts. In other words, conceptualizing a 
cluster of interactions as an accountability relationship may illuminate, rather than 
obfuscate, their core features, dynamics and implications.  
 The potential contribution of the concept of accountability has been enhanced by a 
number of generally compatible attempts at defining accountability in an analytically 
useful way. For instance, Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane identify three core 
elements of accountability: “first, standards that those who are held accountable are 
expected to meet; second, information available to accountability holders, who can then 
apply the standards in question to the performance of those who are held to account; and 
third, the ability of these accountability holders to impose sanctions—to attach costs to 
the failure to meet the standards.” (Buchanan and Keohane 2006). Mark Bovens writes 
that “[a]ccountability is a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor 
has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose 
questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.” (Bovens 2007: 
450, emphasis removed). 
 The fact that similar definitions of accountability are developed in the literatures on 
public administration (e.g. Bovens 2007), democratization studies (e.g. Schedler 1999) 
and international relations (e.g. Grant and Keohane 2005) is a strong indication that its 
core meaning is not dependent on assumptions about the political context defined 
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simply in terms of the presence or absence of statehood. This also suggests that any 
differences between within-state and transnational manifestations of accountability are 
not located at the highest level of conceptual abstraction. This opens the way for 
meaningful comparisons between levels without an immediate danger of conceptual 
stretching.   
 There is also a relatively high level of agreement at a lower level of conceptual 
abstraction, namely with respect to the identification and classification of different 
forms or types of accountability mechanisms. For instance, in the field of public 
administration Romzek and Dubnick (1987) identified “bureaucratic”, “legal”, 
“professional” and “political” accountability, while Dwivedi and Jabbra (1989) 
distinguished among “administrative”, “legal”, “political”, “professional” and “moral” 
accountability. Analysing accountability from an IR perspective, Grant and Keohane 
(2005) list seven mechanisms of accountability: “hierarchical”, “supervisory”, “fiscal”, 
“legal”, “market”, “peer” and “public reputational”. The substantial overlap between 
these and other typologies is a further indication of significant similarities across 
domains.  
 To be sure, typologies do not coincide perfectly. For instance, Grant and Keohane 
(2005) include the market as a mechanism for accountability, while the market is not 
one of forums of accountability listed by Bovens (which are political, legal, 
administrative, professional, and social – but he specifies that the list is not exhaustive). 
This attention to market accountability – that is, to consumers, buyers and investors – 
may be due to the importance that market-based power relationships have in a political 
domain that lacks overarching stateness. There is also some conceptual ambiguity in the 
relationship between “political”, “electoral” and “democratic” accountability. For 
Bovens, elections are only one, albeit seemingly necessary, component of political 
accountability. Schmitter (2004) defines political accountability in a broader way in 
which elections are not a necessary aspect – indeed any accountability relationship 
between rulers and citizens qualifies. Grant and Keohane (2005) exclude electoral 
accountability from their list of accountability mechanisms because it is “not relevant to 
contemporary global institutions”. This exclusion rests on the argument that there is no 
global public that could function as forum for global democratic accountability. But this 
amounts to throwing out the electoral baby with the democratic bathwater. Electoral 
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mechanisms of accountability are not necessarily democratic, in the sense of aiming for 
political equality among those who are affected by the outcome of an election. Member 
states that vote for candidates to become heads of international organizations, 
individuals who vote for executive officers of non-governmental organizations, or 
shareholders who vote for members of company boards exercise a form of electoral 
accountability that is not necessarily democratic.  
 Two conceptual distinctions are arguably important in relation to the distinctiveness 
of transnational accountability. Grant and Keohane (2005) suggest that there are two 
“basic models” of accountability, which provide fundamentally different answers to the 
question: “who is entitled to hold the powerful accountable?” “In the participation 
model, the performance of power-wielders is evaluated by those who are affected by 
their actions. In the delegation model, by contrast, performance is evaluated by those 
entrusting them with powers.” (2005: 31) The distinction is said to be crucial not least 
because the two basic models mandate different strategies and mechanisms for 
accountability. Four of the seven mechanisms they identify (hierarchical, supervisory, 
fiscal, and legal accountability) rely heavily on delegation, while three (market, peer, 
and reputational accountability) involve forms of participation.  The distinction between 
delegation and participation is useful, but not without problems. Consider a claim for 
accountability based on the support that an actor gives to another, for instance by 
providing the resources that the latter needs to be perform a task (e.g. individuals 
making a donation to a disaster relief agency). To the extent that the supporting actor 
demands accountability from the supported actor, this demand may be based neither on 
an authorization to act (e.g., the relief agency may have obtained that from other 
sources) nor on the mere claim that the supporter is “affected” by the performance of 
the supported actor. Support fits uneasily in the delegation-participation framework 
(Keohane 2003). Another difficulty of the framework is that legal accountability is not 
usually based on delegation, as are many forms of “horizontal” and “diagonal” 
accountability relationships (see Bovens 2007). In practice, the distinction between 
delegation and participation may be less relevant than Grant and Keohane maintain.    
 The second potentially important distinction is between what Rubenstein (2007) has 
called standard and surrogate accountability. In the former, accountability holders 
endorse standards, receive information about the power wielder’s compliance with those 
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standards, and (help to) sanction power wielders. In surrogate accountability, each of 
those actions – endorsing standards, receiving information about compliance, and 
sanctioning power wielders - can be performed by a third party “on behalf of” the 
accountability holder. This typically occurs when accountability holders are themselves 
too weak to control and sanction power-wielders. A crucial aspect of surrogate 
accountability is that accountability holders cannot sanction the surrogate or, in other 
words, surrogates are not links in chains of accountability. The distinction between 
standard and surrogate accountability is important theoretically and normatively, but it 
is usually difficult to apply in practice because of the difficulty of determining 
empirically when an actor genuinely acts on behalf of another, less powerful actor, 
instead of simply promoting its own interests and values. Claims to be representing 
another actor and to be exercising surrogate accountability are ubiquitous in domestic 
and international politics, and the need to ascertain which claims are valid and which 
are not makes the distinction between standard and surrogate accountability difficult to 
wield for descriptive and explanatory purposes.  
 
 
2. Aims 
 
Accountability is demanded, supplied and studied mainly because of the expectation 
that it will contribute to establishing, maintaining or enhancing legitimacy. Arguably, 
accountability is neither necessary nor sufficient for legitimacy (and legitimacy is 
neither necessary nor perhaps sufficient for obedience). But there are reasons to believe 
that accountability is likely to enhance the legitimacy of power in the eyes of those who 
have delegated it and of those who are affected by it – as well as being normatively 
desirable from a more impartial point of view. But are there substantial differences in 
the aims of, and expectations towards, accountability systems in national and 
international domains? 
 Bovens has identified three perspectives on the (prescriptively desirable) effects of 
accountability: the democratic perspective, the constitutional perspective, and the 
learning perspective. Each of them is reflected in discussions about transnational 
accountability. According to the democratic perspective, accountability is important 
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because it helps citizens to control those holding public office. This aim is obviously 
particularly relevant in the context of liberal democratic states. However, it is not absent 
from debates on international relations and global governance. Political theorists such as 
Daniele Archibugi (2008) and David Held (1995) argue that globalization binds 
together the fortunes and prospects of political communities around the world, creating 
new “overlapping communities of fate”. If one accepts that “those whose life 
expectancy and life chances are significantly affected by social forces and processes 
ought to have a stake in the determination of the conditions and regulation of these, 
either directly or indirectly through political representatives” (Held 2005: 250), the 
degree to which accountability systems are congruent with those transnational 
“communities of fate” is an important yardstick for determining their legitimacy. 
“Cosmopolitan democracy” is advocated as a multilayered governance system that can 
increase the congruence in the accountability relationships between power-wielders and 
affected communities. 
 According to the constitutional perspective, the main concern is to prevent tyranny, 
corruption and the overbearing power of elected and unelected leaders by means of 
‘checks and balances’, i.e. institutional countervailing powers (Bovens 2007: 463). Also 
this perspective is represented in debates about transnational relations. For instance, 
Grant and Keohane (2005) reject the democratic perspective as unhelpful in the context 
of global politics and instead conceive accountability as a way of mitigating the risk that 
various actors – governments, international bureaucracies, companies, NGOs – will 
abuse their power.   
 Finally, the learning perspective sees accountability as a way to improve the 
effectiveness of policy making and implementation. “The crucial questions from this 
perspective are whether the accountability arrangements offer sufficient feedback, but 
also the right incentives, to officials and agencies to reflect upon their policies and 
procedures and to improve upon them.” (Bovens 2007: 466). Many debates about the 
accountability of transnationally active NGOs, international organizations, and 
transnational corporations focus on this effect. Public administration and non-profit 
management analysts have considered in depth the question of which management 
structures, reporting requirements, evaluation procedures and incentive systems are 
more suitable to improve the performance of organizations involved in international 
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development aid and other forms of service provision (e.g. Cracknell 2000). Donors and 
international agencies promoted and implemented a range of organizational reforms in 
response to shifting perceptions about performance-oriented management, often 
exporting paradigms developed at the national level to the international level (Mizutani 
2004).  
  
3. Existence and frequency 
 
The fact that accountability can be conceptualized and justified in similar ways in 
national and transnational domains obviously does not answer the empirical question of 
whether and how existing accountability systems at the transnational level differ from 
those that are familiar within states, or more specifically within liberal democratic 
states. This section first suggests that differences between governance at the domestic 
level and at the transnational level are not so fundamental as to render any comparison 
meaningless (a). Then it asks whether all accountability forms identified in section 1 can 
actually be found at the transnational level (b). Finally, it considers whether there are 
reasons to expect systematic differences in the nature of accountability forms and their 
relative frequency between domestic and transnational settings (c).        
 
(a)  Modes of governance 
In some “realist” interpretations of world politics, there is a fundamental difference 
between domestic and international politics, and therefore it makes little sense to 
compare the operation of more specific social mechanisms, such as accountability, 
across the two spheres. The highly influential theory of Kenneth Waltz, in particular, 
posits a clear divide between anarchy as the political ordering principle of international 
relations and hierarchy as the political ordering principle of domestic societies. This 
rigid distinction has been the target of sustained criticism over the years (e.g. Milner 
1991), and indeed the increasing use of the concept of “governance” to describe forms 
of political interaction and policy-making in domestic as well as international contexts 
is not only an indication that a rigid analytical separation is unwarranted, but also that 
accountability mechanisms, problems and solutions may apply equally or similarly in 
the two domains (e.g. Benz and Papadopoulos 2006a and Koenig-Archibugi and Zürn 
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2006). It has also been argued that there is a trend towards convergence in the forms of 
governance in the two domains. On the one hand, domestic governance is sometimes 
said to be increasingly exercised through networks and negotiation systems rather than 
traditional hierarchical rule. On the other hand, various authors have pointed at a trend 
towards the supranationalization of international governance (e.g. Zürn 2005). 
 There are certainly remarkable differences between domestic and international 
governance. Above all, the latter remains governance without government, i.e. without a 
world state. This means, amongst other things, that “[h]orizontal consensus seeking, 
negotiation and deliberation are not only established parallel to hierarchic 
subordination, but actually replace it” (Benz and Papadopoulos 2006b: 18). But also the 
similarities are significant. At both levels, there is substantial variation among 
governance arrangements with regard to key institutional characteristics, which 
elsewhere have been grouped into three key dimensions: publicness, inclusiveness and 
delegation (Koenig-Archibugi 2002). Delegation is particularly relevant for this paper 
as it is closely linked to accountability. Delegation of tasks and responsibilities to 
international agents has largely the same causes as delegation to domestic agencies. 
Some delegation occurs because of expected efficiency benefits: gains from 
specialization and the reduction of ex ante and ex post transactions costs (providing 
focal points in negotiations, monitoring compliance, adjudicating disputes, etc.) Some 
delegation occurs because it increases the credibility of commitments in cases of time-
inconsistent preferences. Also “distributional” considerations affect the incentives to 
delegate to domestic and/or international agencies. For instance, politicians manage 
blame by selecting those institutional arrangements that avoid or minimize it, and 
specifically by choosing between direct control and delegation (Hood 2002). 
Internationally, the blame-shifting incentive is often mentioned in the context of the 
relationship between the IMF and its borrowers (e.g. Smith and Vreeland 2006), but it 
also has been invoked to explain delegation to private actors, such as the delegation of 
security tasks in conflict zones to private military contractors (Deitelhoff and Wolf 
2008). Moreover, political leaders whose policy preferences are closer to those of their 
foreign counterparts than their own principals may collude and delegate decision-
making to international agencies to circumvent domestic opposition (Koenig-Archibugi 
2004a). In such cases, avoiding accountability to constituencies is one reason why 
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politicians delegate tasks to agencies in the first place – as pointed out below, this 
incentive in turn affects the design of accountability systems between politicians and 
agencies.  
 
(b) Presence of accountability forms 
In the transnational domain there are empirical instances of all forms of accountability 
mentioned in section 1. A few examples must suffice. The relationship between the 
member states of the United Nations and its secretary-general is a relationship of 
political accountability: the former select the latter, who has to justify his/her decisions 
and can fail to be re-elected if his/her performance is deemed unsatisfactory. The same 
kind of relationship exists between governments and heads of other international 
organizations, who may be forced to resign if the principals lose confidence in them. 
Legal accountability is exercised through a range of international courts, such as the 
International Court of Justice (state accountability), or the International Criminal Court 
(individual accountability), but also through quasi-judicial agencies such as the WTO 
Appellate Body. Administrative accountability is exercised through the regular auditing 
of the accounts and management practices of intergovernmental organizations, but also 
through novel institutions such as the World Bank Inspection Panel (Clark et al. 2003). 
Professional and peer review is exercised by a broad range of transnational forums. For 
instance, NGOs that work together in humanitarian emergencies also monitor and assess 
each other’s performance; and participants in World Health Organization committees on 
standards perceive themselves as a “transnational Hippocratic society”, detached from 
international power politics and bound by professional norms of conduct (David Fidler, 
quoted by Aginam 2005: 72). Market accountability is exercised by consumers and 
investors who, generally after public campaigns conducted by activists, may put 
pressure on companies on labour standards, child labour and other issues concerning 
their global supply chains (Koenig-Archibugi 2004b). Some of these accountability 
relationship are vertical (e.g. the relationship between member states and heads of 
intergovernmental organizations, and between the latter and the staff)  while others are 
horizontal, for instance the relationship between governments that made commitments 
on human rights, labour rights, arms control, macroeconomic policy, environmental 
protection, and then hold each other accountable for compliance through peer review.   
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 As noted above, electoral accountability is not completely absent from transnational 
arenas. Heads of UN agencies and other international organizations are appointed as a 
result of votes or agreements that are concluded under the shadow of a vote. The 
International Council Meeting (ICM) of Amnesty International consist of delegations 
from over 50 nationally organized sections and structures worldwide (in proportion to 
their size) and elects the members of the International Executive Committee and other 
governance bodies. In 2000, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), which controls the centralized domain name system that routes the majority 
of global internet traffic, held a global Internet-based election to choose five of its 
nineteen directors (76,000 people registered to vote), and Internet users can participate 
remotely to meetings where the directors take decisions. Such elections may not qualify 
as “democratic”, but it would be wrong to conclude that electoral accountability lacks 
empirical instances in transnational relations. 
    
(c) Systematic differences 
While present both nationally and internationally, some forms may differ across the two 
levels. Accountability relationships are often parts of larger chains of accountability, by 
which ultimate accountability holders are linked to the ultimate accountability providers 
by intermediaries (Curtin 2007: 525). A distinctive feature of transnational 
accountability is the frequent role of governments as “gate-keepers” in such 
accountability chains. Since most governance beyond the state occurs through 
intergovernmental organizations, governments are in a crucial position of power. For 
instance, in most international courts only states can acts as plaintiffs and defendants 
(Keohane et al. 2000). On the other hand, even in the domain of IGOs, governments can 
no longer always claim a pivotal role in accountability chains. For instance, the World 
Bank is accountable not only to its shareholders but also to international private 
investors who supply capital for its projects. In 2006, UNICEF drew 58 per cent of its 
income from governments and 29 per cent from the private sector and NGOs (UNICEF 
2006). Of the total resources of WHO in 2006-2007, 72 per cent came from voluntary 
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contributions, and of those 11 per cent came from companies, NGOs or foundations – 
notably the Gates Foundation.2 
 A second systematic difference concerns the relative frequency of those forms at the 
national and international level. For instance, relationships of social accountability are 
probably more frequent than legal accountability because “soft law” is more common 
than “hard law” in international relations. Even ILO conventions, which are binding 
international law for states that ratified them, depend entirely on peer review and social 
accountability for their effectiveness. The ILO Committee on the Application of 
Standards can draw public attention to the worst breaches of conventions by 
highlighting them in its reports to the International Labour Conference, but the 
enforcement mechanism is significantly weaker than those usually associated with 
domestic legislation on labour issues.  
 Finally, for all forms of accountability, surrogate versions are particularly common in 
transnational relations because of three factors: (1) structural inequalities in the global 
system mean that the power differentials between accountability holders and power 
wielders are usually greater than domestically; (2) at the transnational level there is a 
lack of formal institutions that would allow the operation of standard accountability; and 
(3) the larger social and physical distance between accountability holders and power 
wielders reduces the breadth and depth of common life-world experiences as well as the 
intensity and velocity of communication, which hinders standard accountability. 
 
 
4. Causes and trends 
  
What causes the creation and modification of accountability regimes? More specifically, 
what explains variation of accountability regimes across issue areas, geographical 
domains, and institutions? The creation of accountability regimes can be interpreted in 
terms of the interplay between the demands for accountability expressed by principals 
and affected parties on the one hand and the responses of power wielders on the other 
                                                 
2 http://www.who.int/about/vision/voluntary_contributions_en.gif (accessed on 19 September 
2008). 
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hand. This section considers the demands (a) and the responses (b) before examining 
whether there are reasons to expect that the relationship between demand and response 
is more contentious at the transnational level than it is in domestic contexts (c). Given 
that most accountability regimes require a multicausal and complex explanation, the 
following remarks should be seen as exploratory.   
 
(a) Demands 
The demand for accountability depends to a significant extent on three bundles of 
factors: (i) the characteristics of the governance arrangement to which it is directed; (ii) 
the characteristics of the issue that the governance arrangement is supposed to address; 
and (iii) trends in the broader political, social and cultural environment in which policy 
making takes place. 
 With regard to (i), some authors maintain that “the very nature of accountability 
depends on the model of governance that one employs” (Keohane and Nye 2003: 393). 
But, interestingly, there is less fit between governance modes and accountability modes 
than one might expect. First, as Keohane and Nye (2003: 403) recognize, in reality the 
models of governance they identify are usually blended, and so are accountability 
forms. Second, several forms of accountability are exercised in virtually every kind of 
organization and network: intergovernmental organizations are subject not only to 
administrative accountability, but also to market accountability and reputational 
accountability; conversely, private actors may delegate powers to third parties and this 
creates principal-agent problems that are similar to those to be found in 
intergovernmental organizations. In short, there is no simple one-to-one relationship 
between modes of governance and accountability forms.  
 However, it is certainly possible to identify links and correspondences between 
governance characteristics and accountability dynamics. If we refer to the three 
institutional dimensions of inclusiveness, publicness and delegation (see above), all else 
being equal, lower inclusiveness (defined as the presence of significant policy 
externalities) stimulates the mobilization of those negatively affected by decisions and 
demands to justify those decisions in a public forum. On the contrary, when the 
externalities are positive, the “insiders” may demand accountability from the “free-
riders” who choose to remain outside of the governance arrangement. Publicness is a 
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less obvious determinant of accountability demands, but it is plausible that the greater 
coercion potential that derives from the exercise of public power generates a stronger 
interest in having that power checked through accountability mechanisms. In other 
words, it is not only the presence of external effects but also the voluntary/coercive 
nature of inclusiveness that stimulates demand. Finally, delegation has arguably a strong 
effect on accountability demands: the more functions and discretionary powers are 
delegated to agents, the more the principals may have reasons for wanting mechanisms 
for holding them accountable. Principals typically employ ex ante as well as ex post 
mechanisms to control their agents, but the former – such as the use of detailed rules 
and the selection of agents whose preferences are similar to those of the principal – 
generate some problems that may highlight the benefits of ex post control based on 
reporting and sanctioning (Hawkins et al. 2006: 26-31). But also ex post control 
requirements may reduce the benefits of delegation to the principal if they become too 
demanding. This applies to situations in which delegation is motivated primarily by 
efficiency concerns. For instance, it can be argued that principals such as the US 
Congress often prefer to create accountability mechanisms that empower affected 
parties through administrative law because such “fire alarms” limit the efficiency 
benefits of delegation less than “police patrols”, i.e. intense and comprehensive 
oversight by Congress itself (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). But it also applies to 
situations in which delegation is motivated primarily by the desire to shift blame: 
clearly high levels of accountability of agents to political principals would make this 
strategy less credible (Hood 2002). 
 The sources of accountability demands that have been mentioned so far may result 
largely from a “logic of consequentialism”: actors demand accountability mechanisms if 
and when they rationally expect those mechanisms to further their interests. However, 
also the “logic of appropriateness” plays a role (March and Olsen 1998). Even people 
who may not benefit directly from accountability mechanisms may believe that the 
existence of such mechanisms is necessary to confer “legitimacy” to governance 
arrangements and transnational actors such as international bureaucracies and NGOs 
(Zürn 2005). The demand for accountability mechanisms is then not targeted at a 
specific governance arrangement, but generically at all governance arrangements of a 
certain type. What exactly is considered “appropriate” may still differ depending on 
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institutional characteristics – such as publicness, inclusiveness and delegation – but the 
upshot is that we cannot assume a close fit between the costs and benefits of alternative 
institutional designs for specific groups on the one hand and the preferences of these 
groups for the existence and form of accountability mechanisms on the other: beliefs 
about legitimacy may intervene in this relationship.  
 An increased demand for accountability as a condition of legitimacy can result of the 
macrotrends that characterize contemporary global politics according to James Rosenau. 
He specifically points at “authority crises” that encourage individuals to replace 
traditional criteria of legitimacy with performance criteria; but also at a “skill 
revolution” that expands peoples’ horizons on a global scale and sensitizes them to the 
relevance of distant events; an “organizational explosion” that increases the capacity of 
opposition groups to press for alternative policies and divides publics from their elites; 
and “microelectronic technologies” that enable like-minded people to be in touch with 
each other anywhere in the world (Rosenau 2003: 71).  
 While the orientations and capabilities of either issue-specific or general publics 
affect the intensity and content of accountability demands – regardless of whether they 
are based on principal-agent relationships or claims of affectedness – some pressure to 
conform to general legitimacy requirement can also result from the diffusion of norms 
within specific organizational clusters, such as the idea that multilateral organizations 
should adopt budgetary procedures in line with Result-Based Budgeting (RBB) 
approaches (Mizutani 2004, Scott 2005). In the area of private transnational governance, 
a similar diffusion effect has occurred with regard to the idea that companies should be 
reporting systematically on social and environmental performance and implement codes 
of conduct or – less commonly – that they should engage in multistakeholder 
partnerships on social and environmental issues (Koenig-Archibugi 2004b; Ruggie 
2003). 
 While factors triggering demands for accountability mechanisms may be the same in 
domestic and international contexts, for instance corruption scandals, important 
differences need to be kept in mind. Steffek (2003) points out that states are subject to 
special legitimacy expectations, as the relationships of domination they embody are 
largely involuntary, backed by highly coercive powers, and potentially covering any 
issue. Most if not all non-state governance arrangements do not possess these 
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characteristics, and thus the demands on their legitimacy are different, and generally 
weaker.    
 
(b) Responses 
Agents have usually little choice about how to respond to accountability demands from 
their principals. Accountability mechanisms can be specified at the time of delegation 
and built in the “constitution” of the governance arrangement, or they can be added 
later, for instance in the form of increasing reporting requirements. In any case, agents 
are unlikely to be able to resist the imposition of accountability requirements, at least 
when the demands of the most influential principals converge. Of course, this 
convergence does not always occur. An example of (initial) divergence are the debates 
about the shift to Result-Based Budgeting within the United Nations. In the late 1990s 
the UN member states that had reformed their public administrations in line with New 
Public Management (NPM) doctrines, such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the 
Nordic countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, supported the adoption of 
RBB within the UN, but the reluctance of developing countries (but also Japan and 
Russia) slowed down the reform process for three years, until the General Assembly 
adopted a comprehensive resolution in December 2000 (Mizutani 2004). Grigorescu 
(2008) shows that in the early 1990s Western democracies disagreed on the nature and 
the level of independence of what would become the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services of the United Nations.  
 If accountability demands voiced by a broad coalition of principals are irresistible, 
the impact of accountability demands voiced by supporters who are not formally 
principals, for instance donors, is more indeterminate. In such cases, agencies may resist 
accountability demands, as long as competition for resources among agencies does not 
create a substantial incentive to accommodate requests. For instance, the WHO found 
itself in a more competitive environment for health policy funding since the early 1990s 
and had to establish new accountability mechanisms. 
 
(c) Contentiousness 
For the comparison between domestic and transnational accountability regimes, the 
question of the contentiousness of accountability relationships and the existence of a 
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gap between demands and responses is probably more important than a simple mapping 
of either demands or responses. The question is whether we can expect to see more 
contention about accountability relationships in transnational contexts than in domestic 
ones. For Grant and Keohane (2005), the politics of accountability is less contentious in 
states, or at least in democratic states, because the participation view and the delegation 
view of accountability converge in what they see as appropriate accountability 
mechanisms (e.g., democratic elections), whereas participation-based demands and 
delegation-based demands often clash at the international level. The convergence is 
more problematic at the international level partly because of the lack of coincidence of 
jurisdictions and boundaries of interdependence, which means that there is a more 
general incongruence between decision-makers and decision-takers (Held 1995). But 
contentiousness may not be due primarily to a conflict between the delegation and the 
participation view of accountability. On a normative level, there is widespread and 
probably increasing agreement that being affected by a decision generates some kind of 
entitlement to participation, also in those cases when power is exercised across state 
boundaries. To the extent that obstacles to accountability are normative and not based 
purely on self-interest, contention is thus less likely to stem from some actors’ rejection 
of affectedness as legitimate reason for demanding accountability, and more likely to 
result from the difficulty of reaching agreement on how to verify and aggregate 
competing claims of affectedness in specific situations. In democratic states, the 
adjudication of competing affectedness claims is ultimately performed by voters. In 
transnational relations, “stakeholder identification” is a problematic and continuously 
contested process. Some governance arrangements “solve” the problem by assuming 
that states adequately represent all relevant interests within their jurisdictions and hence 
state-based consent and accountability mechanisms should be sufficient to legitimize 
policies. But this “solution” is itself contested, given the fact that some states are not 
considered to be representative, and that intergovernmental modes of cooperation do not 
guarantee a distribution of influence that can be widely perceived as “fair”. 
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5. Effects of accountability 
  
There is no single and generally accepted metric to assess the effects of accountability 
mechanisms. As noted above, Bovens identifies three general approaches to the 
justification of accountability, which offer quite different yardsticks for assessing its 
consequences: they focus on (a) its capacity to promote learning and policy 
effectiveness, (b) its capacity to limit abuses of power, and (c) its capacity to realize 
popular control and democracy, respectively. This section offers some exploratory 
remarks on each of these approaches in relation to transnational relations. 
 
(a) Enhancing learning and effectiveness 
The link between accountability and effectiveness in transnational governance is 
curiously under-researched. This is partly due to the difficulties of defining what 
effectiveness is, which in turn partly depends on the fact that most policies, even when 
agreed in principle, are likely to remain controversial in practice because of their uneven 
impacts on interests and values. 
 Evaluation teams assessing major programmes of international organizations usually 
try to evaluate the effect of decision-making and implementation procedures on 
outcomes. However, they usually do not evaluate the basic accountability systems of 
those organizations, as such a task would normally exceed their terms of reference. 
Systematic attempts by donor governments to assess the comparative “effectiveness” of 
international organizations as a whole normally focus on procedures rather than 
outcomes (Meier 2007). For instance, the Multilateral Effectiveness Framework 
(MEFF) developed by the UK Department for International Development (DfID) 
focuses on organisational aspects and specifically on corporate governance, corporate 
strategy, resource management, operational management, quality assurance, staff 
management, monitoring, evaluation and lesson-learning, and results reporting, rather 
than the actual results achieved (Scott 2005). Similarly, the Multilateral Organisations 
Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), which consists of eight donor 
governments, conducted several surveys on various international organizations since 
2003, which however are limited to examining the “partnership behaviour” of those 
organizations in the countries in which they operate. 
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 Academic studies of effectiveness are more likely to connect effectiveness (as 
behavioural effectiveness or as problem-solving) with basic institutional features3, but 
there are few studies that conceptualize institutional features in terms of accountability 
mechanisms, and general conclusions about the link between different accountability 
regimes and different aspects of effectiveness are still scarce and tentative. On the 
whole, there is still little evidence that the distinctive constellation of accountability 
mechanisms that exists at the transnational level has specific effects on effectiveness, 
however defined. A comparative study of compliance with domestic, EU and WTO law, 
for instance, finds that compliance with domestic law is not higher than compliance 
with EU and WTO – a finding that leads the authors to reject the hypothesis that “legal 
equality and high compliance rates require an agent that can generally enforce rules on 
the basis of a superior availability of material resources and can cast a shadow of 
hierarchy” (Zürn and Joerges 2005: 3). 
 
(b) Curbing abuses of power 
Authors such as Grant and Keohane are cautiously optimistic that various accountability 
mechanisms can contribute to curbing abuses of power in global politics. However, the 
ability of imposing sanctions is crucial for the performance of this function, and 
“sanctions remain the weak point in global accountability since they can only be 
implemented by the powerful” (Grant and Keohane 2005: 41). While transnational 
accountability mechanisms potentially counteract abuses of power mainly by mobilizing 
already existing powerful actors, this does not mean that those powerful actors are 
always the beneficiaries of the behavioural change induced by the possible or actual 
application of sanctions. For instance, international investors may impose sanctions on 
mining companies that are suspected of harming the interests of indigenous 
communities, as it happened in 1996 when Rio Tinto share prices declined allegedly as 
a result of the opposition of Australian indigenous groups to the Century Zinc Mine in 
Queensland’s Gulf of Carpentaria (Trebeck 2007). In such cases, investors may not act 
with the goal of changing a company’s behaviour towards affected communities. In 
other circumstances, (the threat of) sanctioning often emerges as part of a deliberate 
                                                 
3 See for instance Miles et al. 2002; Young 1999; and Underdal and Young 2004. 
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strategy implemented by transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998). 
This is the essence of surrogate accountability as it has been discussed above, and 
indeed it appears to be the case that labour rights activists emerged as counterweight to 
the power of companies in several contexts. This is one of the reasons why, as Benz and 
Papadopoulos (2006b: 21) note, “[i]n international governance, private actors […] draw 
attention as actors who can improve legitimacy, while in national and subnational 
arenas these actors are often deemed to cause legitimacy problems.”  
 Are there reasons to believe that surrogate accountability – beyond its intrinsic 
limitations discussed by Rubenstein (2007) – is less effective in mitigating abuses of 
power in transnational contexts than it is in domestic contexts? One major problem is 
the fact that the larger physical and social distance between the surrogate sanctioners 
and the intended beneficiaries reduces the ability of the former to understand the 
preferences and situation of the latter. For instance, it is widely believed that the 
measures taken by several US trade unions and labour rights groups and directed at US 
companies importing garments from Bangladesh after revelations of extensive use of 
child labour in the Bangladeshi garment industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
resulted in the rapid dismissal of an estimated 30,000 to 40,000 children from factories 
and a deterioration of child welfare (White 1996, Hertel 2006). Responsibilities for 
these developments as well as the long-term impact of the consumer action campaign is 
still debated, but it is plausible that the communication barriers between (well-meaning) 
US consumers, activists and legislators on the one hand and the supposed beneficiaries 
of their sanctioning power on the other hand made the market-based accountability 
mechanism less effective than it might have been in a domestic context. In the latter, the 
decisive leverage on behalf of workers’ interests is usually exercised by the workers 
themselves – either directly through trade unions or indirectly through pro-labour 
political parties – rather than by foreign activists, consumers and investors. Such a 
constellation alleviates the basic problem of surrogate accountability, which is the 
danger that surrogates “will sanction in the wrong cases, with the wrong intensity, or in 
the wrong way (where “wrong” means doing something other than what accountability 
holders would have done)” (Rubenstein 2007). 
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(c) Realizing democracy 
The assessment of transnational accountability from a democratic perspective raises two 
major questions: (i) As a matter of principle, is “democratic” accountability possible at 
the transnational level? (ii) If so, which, if any, existing experiences of transnational 
accountability do qualify as “democratic”?  
 This paper cannot even start to address the very extensive debate on question (i).4 
Reflecting the views of many sceptics, Grant and Keohane (2005) note that the absence 
of a global public rules out the possibility of democratic forms of world-wide 
accountability. If this is true, the key question then becomes whether the formation of a 
global public is empirically possible. Scepticism is often explicitly or implicitly rooted 
in beliefs about “necessary conditions” for the existence of a “demos” that would be 
able to sustain democracy, such as a minimum level of cultural homogeneity, economic 
prosperity and economic equality. Since a detailed criticism of these arguments is 
presented in Koenig-Archibugi (2008), the remainder of this section assumes that, if the 
experiences of democratization within states provide any insights, global structural 
conditions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to global democracy. 
 Affirming the possibility of transnational democratic accountability is compatible 
with recognizing the distinctive problems that it faces. Both from a delegation and from 
a participation perspective, important aspects of democratic accountability can be 
expected to be weaker in transnational than in domestic settings. From a delegation 
perspective, chains of delegation and accountability are likely to be the longer the 
higher the governance level. The potential for “agency slack” is increased. From a 
participation perspective, two problems are particularly salient. First, claims based on 
delegation still carry much more weight than claims based on being affected by the 
actions of the power-wielders. In other words, accountability is too much oriented 
towards formal principals than would be democratically “optimal”. Second, even if 
affectedness was the key criterion for accountability relationships, participation would 
be diluted as a result of the larger scale of transnational governance (Dahl 1999).   
                                                 
4 See for instance Held 1995, Dahl 1999, Kymlicka 1999, Keohane 2003; Archibugi 2008.  
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 Even people who would answer “yes” to question (i) above may still answer “no” to 
question (ii) - in other words, transnational democratic accountability may be possible 
in principle, but for some reason it has not been realized yet. The reasons why existing 
accountability regimes may be seen as falling short of reasonable thresholds of 
democratic quality are manifold. For instance, it has been argued that most or all 
intergovernmental institutions violate principles of political equality, among member 
states and/or among their citizens. This may be because some member states have a 
disproportionate influence on decision-making as a result of superior extra-institutional 
resources and hence better exit options, and/or because such superiority is reflected in 
institutionally formalized differences in voting and veto power (Zweifel 2006; see also 
Moravcsik 2005).  
 Non-governmental organizations have been hailed as agents able to stimulate and 
sustain democratic accountability in global governance.5 James Rosenau (1998) 
interprets the activities of businesses, non-profit NGOs and social movements as 
providing “functional equivalents” of important aspects of territorial democracy in the 
globalized space (Rosenau 1998: 41-43). “Global civil society” is seen as having a two-
fold role with regard to democratic accountability. One the one hand, it may promote 
the democratization of governmental and intergovernmental centres of authority. For 
instance, in their discussion of the legitimacy of international institutions, Buchanan and 
Keohane (2005) note that “a functioning transnational civil society channel of 
accountability—an array of overlapping networks of external epistemic actors—helps to 
compensate for the limitations of accountability through democratic state consent.” Jan 
Art Scholte (2005) has provided a comprehensive inventory of the ways in which civil 
society organizations increase the democratic accountability of global governance, but 
he has also highlighted significant challenges to their potential contribution.   
 On the other hand, it has been argued that civil society organizations may promote 
transnational democratic accountability by contributing to the establishment of 
governance arrangements that operate independently from state power. In an important 
article, Kate and Terry Macdonald (2006) have argued that global democratic 
accountability can potentially be achieved through non-electoral mechanisms embedded 
                                                 
5 See for instance the critical analyses by Nanz and Steffek 2005, Wolf 2006 and Glasius 2008. 
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in non-state transnational governance arrangements. They illustrate their argument with 
reference to transnational institutions promoting labour standards in the global garment 
industry. To the extent that in such institutions a set of citizens hold power-holders 
accountable on behalf of a distinct set of citizens, for instance when consumers impose 
sanctions on companies on behalf of workers in global supply chains, they represent a 
form of surrogate accountability. Surrogate accountability can without doubt be 
valuable in promoting the interests and rights of people affected by power-wielders. 
However, since a crucial aspect of surrogate accountability is that accountability holders 
cannot sanction the surrogate, their functioning hardly fulfils principles of political 
equality and thus their democratic nature is questionable. 
 Even if non-electoral accountability mechanisms cannot be considered functional 
equivalents of electoral mechanisms based on democratic representation, they may still 
be considered as second-best solutions to promote “government for the people” under 
conditions in which “government by the people” is not (yet) possible. However, the 
relationship between non-electoral and representative-electoral accountability becomes 
more problematic in such situations in which the former develops at the expense of the 
latter. Yannis Papadopoulos, for instance, has noted that the “peer” accountability on 
which most forms of network governance are based “can hardly be achieved without 
some loss of accountability ‘at home’ The ‘logic of influence’ tending to prevail among 
elites involved in mutual deliberation and negotiation seldom coincides with the ‘logic 
of membership’ consisting of mirroring the preferences of their constituencies.” 
(Papadopoulos 2007: 482). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
Not surprisingly, this overview of transnational accountability has found differences as 
well as commonalities with accountability in domestic settings. The key conclusion is 
that there is no clear-cut and consistent divide between those two governance levels 
with regard to the conceptualization, the normative importance and justification, the 
empirical manifestations, and the causes of accountability mechanisms. Few actors 
operating in transnational spheres are “unaccountable”, or accountable only to a strictly 
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national constituency. Moreover, the range of accountability relationships to be found at 
the transnational level resembles those that are familiar in domestic politics. These 
findings provide strong support for allowing concepts, hypotheses and methods 
developed for studying accountability mechanisms within states to be employed in the 
domain of International Relations, and vice versa.6  
 Disagreements among analysts concern mainly the consequences of accountability 
regimes, and whether any of those manifestations of transnational accountability 
deserves to be called “democratic”. Accountability is obviously different from 
democratic accountability. This article suggested that, partly because institutions 
reproduce prior inequalities and partly because of the prevalence of surrogate 
accountability mechanisms, few transnational governance institutions meet even 
minimal democratic criteria. However, observers are divided over what explains the 
lack of democratic accountability in world politics, and hence over the prospects of 
changing this state of affairs. Some regard it as structurally determined and largely 
unavoidable, while others see it as a contingent outcome of political agency and subject 
to change through strategic action and institutional design.  
 The developments explored in this article justify some cautious optimism. For 
instance, electoral accountability does have a role in transnational relations and its 
democratizing potential is not necessarily exhausted. Perhaps more importantly, few 
still argue that only strictly defined principals are entitled to hold global organizations 
accountable, as prescribed in what Grant and Keohane called the “delegation” view of 
accountability. The idea that accountability is also due to those most directly and 
intensely affected by decisions is gaining ground as a potentially hegemonic global 
norm. Even if this norm does not directly translate into demands to establish fully-
fledged democratic institutions at the global level, there is wide consensus on the 
desirability and feasibility of institutional changes that could reduce the gap between 
affectedness and inclusion in transnational accountability regimes. The ascendancy of 
“democratic” accountability in world politics is far from assured, but the odds are 
                                                 
6 A study that demonstrates the payoffs of comparing analogous accountability mechanisms in 
domestic and international settings is Grigorescu (2008). 
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sufficiently high as to justify sustained efforts in institutional imagination and 
experimentation. 
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